Images of Nationhood and Tolerance of Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe

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Abstract

In recent years, scholars of nationalism have brought renewed focus on political and cultural conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. Drawing on this literature, namely the idea of citizenship regime types, I develop a macro-theoretical framework for understanding cross-national variations in tolerance levels toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. Specifically, I hypothesize that nation-states with more exclusive legal and cultural conceptions of citizenship will have lower aggregate levels of both political and social tolerance. Employing empirical data from a 1997 Eurobarometer survey, I then systematically test the framework, as well as competing explanations, for all member states of the European Union. The results confirm the hypotheses and indicate a strong and significant relationship between citizenship regime type and native populations’ tolerance of ethnic minorities and immigrants.
This paper asks whether political institutions and cultural policies affect tolerance for ethnic minorities across Western Europe. Western Europe has experienced a rapid influx of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers over recent decades. This trend is making what were once relatively homogeneous populations increasingly heterogeneous (Threanhardt, 1992). Turks in Germany, Somalis and Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom, Algerians in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands—every western European nation has experienced an increased presence of diverse ethnic groups.

While immigration is not a new issue for Europe, the nature of the issue is new. Post World War II migration patterns largely involved movement within Europe, primarily from southern to northern Europe; however, immigrants today are increasingly arriving from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South America. Not only do these groups have language and cultural backgrounds sharply different from those of their host nations, but they also have visible physical features, including, most evidently, the color of their skin, that immediately distinguish them from the native population. Moreover, because birthrates of the native populations are declining, while the birthrates of new minorities remain higher, ethnic minorities are likely to become even more visible across Europe. Relatedly, and what is often overlooked in the debate, many analysts argue that Europe must bring in more immigrants in order to sustain its economic growth and prosperity.

Despite often filling an important need for unskilled labor in their host countries, Europe’s new minorities have been met with considerable resistance from the native populations. The resurgent success of right-wing nationalist parties (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) and a general increase in violence toward ethnic and racial minorities (Koopmans, 1996) are the most visible manifestations of this opposition. These extreme responses have received increased attention from political leaders, the media, and scholars alike. Yet, at a more basic level ethnic minorities regularly face prejudice and a general attitude of intolerance from native populations (Pettigrew, 1997; Fetzer, 2000; Sniderman et al., 2000). Tolerance is a fundamental and necessary value of pluralistic democracies. It requires citizens to uphold and secure the right of groups, even those they find objectionable, to participate fully in political, social and economic life (Sullivan et al., 1982; Sniderman, 1996). Failure to respect the rights of all and tolerate minority voices may lead to social and economic oppression, or “tyranny of the majority.” This paper, thus, examines native populations’ tolerance for ethnic minorities across Western Europe.

Drawing on the emerging literature on citizenship laws and scholarly debates about multiculturalism, I develop a macro-theoretical framework to explain cross-national differences in tolerance levels. In line with “new institutionalism,” it is important to recognize that the
organization of political life has important consequences for the nature of politics (March and Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Lijphart, 1999). Institutions shape political conflict by creating opportunities and incentives for elites to mobilize citizens. Moreover, they help structure and channel the nature of political discourse among both political elites and citizens. At the micro-level, institutions affect social and political tolerance for ethnic minorities in that citizenship laws and government policies define, as well as embody, cultural traditions regarding who is a legitimate member of the nation-state. I hypothesize that the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition is institutionalized in the laws, rules, norms and routines of a nation-state influences the level of tolerance toward ethnic minorities in a country.

The paper is structured in the following manner. First, I discuss the concept of tolerance and the role of group membership and identity in inter-group relations. Second, I turn to a discussion of how macro-structures, that is, institutions and cultural traditions relating to citizenship in nation-states, influence social and political tolerance. Based on the citizenship regime and multiculturalism literature, I propose a four-fold typology of ideal tolerance regimes. Employing a special module on prejudice and tolerance from a 1997 Eurobarometer Survey, I then examine the relationship between the citizenship regime types and aggregate levels of individual political and social tolerance toward ethnic minorities. Finally, I review more conventional approaches toward tolerance, in order to draw out several competing hypotheses, which I then examine more systematically.

The Nature of Tolerance and Group Identity

Although studies on tolerance constitute a significant area of public opinion research, it nevertheless remains a rather slippery concept. Attempts to measure it are often met with stark criticism, as there are competing claims about how one should understand tolerance. In this paper, I am concerned not about tolerance for eccentric or dissident individuals, but rather the respect and recognition of equal rights for groups that in some sense are marginalized as a result of their political views or social position in a society. This may include a diverse array of groups—this research focuses on race, linguistic, or ethnic minorities. Ethnic conflict has been endemic in the latter part of the 20th century, and it is intolerance of ethnic difference that undergirds such conflict.

Tolerance, like liberty and equality, is a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic credo. Principled tolerance requires not only recognition of rights, but also its application in concrete, specific cases. 2 Although tolerance may take many forms (Walzer 1997), scholars often conceptualize it at minimum as a principled recognition that “others” are entitled to social and political rights even if they exercise those rights in unattractive ways (Sullivan et al., 1982). Most studies of tolerance restrict their analysis to this type, however, it is worth recognizing that tolerant attitudes may and possibly ought to take a stronger form. This includes a genuine openness, curiosity, and perhaps respect for different ideas and groups, or at a greater extreme, an enthusiastic endorsement of difference for its own sake (Walzer, 1997).

2 The tolerance literature often distinguishes between principled and specific tolerance, as often survey respondents will support rights for all in the abstract, yet when asked about these rights regarding specific groups they dislike, they deny the groups equal rights. This may be a useful distinction in determining empirically whether individuals are truly tolerant, but analytically it is a false dichotomy. Quite simply, individuals willing to deny equal rights to specific, disliked groups are not tolerant.

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While stronger forms of tolerance may be more desirable, social-psychological research on group identification and behavior indicates there are powerful forces hindering such a development. Humans are fundamentally social animals, and as such, our social environment and group memberships have a strong influence on how we view ourselves. Indeed, humans define themselves, as well as others, largely in terms of the social groups to which they belong. Group identification, however, is not simply a one-sided process; the social definition of who we are also implies who we are not. In other words, group identification only has meaning when “we associate ourselves with certain groups and contrast ourselves with others” (Turner, 1982: 18). For example, being an American only has meaning because there are other countries of which one may be a citizen, and being Christian only has meaning in the context of other religious affiliations. In short, the presence of difference is what creates identity and social meaning for individuals. Humans categorize and classify others into ingroup and outgroup categories in order to make sense out of the world and their place in that world.

This cognitive process of differentiation is necessary and not harmful in and of itself. Social psychologists, however, also have shown that cognitive categorization does have important affects on human behavior in the context of intergroup relations. Specifically, individuals tend to hold positive attitudes toward and favor ingroup members, while expressing negative dispositions and discriminating against outgroup members. The power and significance of the *ingroup / outgroup bias* phenomenon was demonstrated in Henri Tajfel's groundbreaking work on intergroup conflict (Tajfel, 1970, 1978, 1981). Known as the *minimal group paradigm*, Tajfel demonstrated that simply assigning subjects randomly to groups “reliably produced a number of impressive outcomes, such as the exaggeration of between-group differences, the attenuation of within-group differences, the differential allocation of resources favoring the ingroup, and evaluative preferences for ingroup members” (Sherman et al., 1999: 86). Much work has been done in this area under the label of Social Identity Theory (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Abrams and Hogg, 1999), however, for our purposes we simply want to lay out the propositions most relevant to our understanding of tolerance.

1) In inter-group relations, individuals tend to accentuate differences between their perceived in-group and that of out-groups (Hamilton et al., 1994).

2) Fellow in-group members are evaluated more positively in comparison to out-group members, as this is thought to translate to individual self-affirmation and self-esteem (Turner, 1982).

3) Individual differences among in-group members are more likely to be recognized, whereas differences among out-group members are minimized (Hamilton et al., 1994).

4) The effects of in-group / out-group bias are enhanced when the categorization is important, or salient, to the perceiver (Tajfel, 1957).
5) The stronger, or more rigid, the categorization of out-groups, the more likely one is to be prejudiced toward and discriminate against out-group members, as well as favor in-group members (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Brown, 1995; Tajfel, 1978).

There are myriad social groupings in a society, and hence, a near infinite number of combinations and bases for group conflict. Yet, it is those based on basic cleavage lines in a society, such as race, religion, language, culture and class that are of particular concern to students of intergroup conflict and tolerance. These social groups are particularly enduring in that they are also the primary vehicles for childhood and cultural socialization. They help shape individuals’ worldviews, which in turn give security and meaning to life. Moreover, it is these groups that often provide the basis for social relations in every day human interaction. Individuals with a given cultural, religious, race, or linguistic tradition are more likely to interact regularly with those of similar backgrounds. When these social groupings overlap in a society, for example when ethnic minorities are also over-represented among the lower class, inter-group differences are likely to be more salient, and hence, the likelihood of inter-group conflict also increases. This near universal tendency for individuals to categorize themselves and others into groups is a significant barrier to the development of tolerant attitudes and as an extension a tolerant society.

**Macro-Theoretical Framework: Citizenship Regimes and Cultural Policy**

In applying the insights of Social Identity Theory, a few recent studies of tolerance have examined more closely the context of ethnic relations. This research confirms that perceptions of threat and strong in-group / out-group identities do play a significant role in tolerance judgments. However, an important drawback of this research is that it is either based on controlled laboratory experiments (Marcus et al., 1995) or tolerance in a single nation-state (Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Sniderman, 2000). As such, these studies have two weaknesses. First, they cannot account for cross-national differences in tolerance levels. Second, ultimately they fall back on ingrained, psycho-personality characteristics and individual economic interests as explanations for the etiology of tolerance. The basic problem with such studies is they do not account for why individuals come to view ethnicity as a significant basis of group categorization in the first place. Ethnicity is not a natural or primordial basis of group categorization. Rather, it like most cognitive categories is socially constructed (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Cornell and Hartmann, 1998; James, 1999). Why is ethnicity salient to individuals? More specifically, why does it become so important that some are willing to deny basic political liberties to members of other ethnic groups? What accounts for cross-national differences in tolerance judgments of ethnic minorities? To answer these questions, we need to move to a more macro-level of analysis and examine more systemic factors.

At its most basic level, ethnic tolerance is a question of acceptance in a social or political community. In the modern world, the preeminent social and political community is the nation-

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3 For studies drawing directly on Social Identity Theory, see Gibson and Gouws (2000) and Sniderman et al. (2000). Marcus et al. (1995) also focus on the context of tolerance judgements—although not explicitly drawing on Social Identity Theory.
state. It claims and exercises ultimate authority over all individuals and activities within its territorial borders. Legitimate membership in a nation-state brings with it certain rights and privileges. In the context of intra-state ethnic relations, legitimate membership entails ethnic minorities being entitled to the same rights and privileges as the majority population. At one level, this refers to basic political liberties, such as freedom of speech and association, as well as the right to vote and run for political office. Yet, at another level it refers to the content of that expression—that is, the right to express cultural difference, and the acceptance of this by the majority population. The former is political tolerance, whereas the latter I define as social tolerance.

Although many recognize the relevance of system level factors, scholars often assume tolerance to be an ideal value embodied equally in all democracies. As such, variability among individuals is assumed to be simply the result of factors that facilitate or impede the social learning process (Duch and Gibson, 1992). In other words, conventional approaches have failed to identify possible competing systemic influences on tolerance judgements. Ethnicity is a salient basis of group bias in virtually all nation-states; nevertheless, its degree of political and social salience may vary substantially. Specifically, I hypothesize that the salience of ethnic difference, and as a consequence tolerance for ethnic minorities, depends on the degree to which a dominant ethnic tradition or culture is institutionalized in the laws, rules, norms, and policies of a state.4

Scholarship on ethnic difference and citizenship has experienced a vigorous revival in recent years. Among political philosophers this revival is rooted in debates about multiculturalism, communitarianism, and group rights (Walzer, 1983; Taylor and Gutmann, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). Concerning citizenship, the central question is whether certain individuals, because of their membership in a specific group, should have different rights, privileges, and duties to the state. This may involve granting special cultural privileges to ethnic minorities, such as the use of peyote in certain American Indian religious ceremonies or granting military duty exemptions to members of pacifist religious sects. At a greater extreme, it may entail ceding greater autonomy and sovereignty in political decision making to territorially concentrated ethnic groups, for example, as has been done in the creation of separate Scottish and Welsh parliaments within the United Kingdom. The important point is nation-states vary in terms of the responsibilities and duties of citizens. Citizenship may take the form of strict assimilation to the same rights, duties and cultural orientation as those of the dominant ethnic tradition, or minorities may be able to maintain their distinct traditions and retain specific group rights.

While the political philosophy debates have been primarily normative and prescriptive, the issues of ethnic difference and citizenship have been treated with greater analytical focus in the burgeoning literature on right-wing, xenophobic movements and nationalism (Brubaker, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992; Calhoun, 1997; Hechter, 2000). It is generally understood that the nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991); however, scholars recognize that it can be

4 An argument could also be made that causality runs in the opposite direction. That is, the reason some states have less institutionalization of the dominant ethnic tradition is precisely because the native population was more open and tolerant in the first place. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that institutions have a significant impact on tolerance attitudes—including, most importantly, the rather ephemeral nature of ingroup / outgroup behavior as indicated by Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm.
imagined in different ways. Furthermore, how a nation-state is imagined has important implications for new immigrants and ethnic minorities. It affects how ethnic minorities are incorporated into the nation-state, as well as policies toward the public and political expression of their cultural traditions.

Roger Brubaker's (1992) comparative historical study of nationalism and citizenship in Germany and France served as an important impetus for the renewed scholarly focus on the politics of ethnic relations. Following a common distinction in the literature, Brubaker identifies two types of nationalist images—ethnic and civic. Yet, as several scholars have pointed out, this simple distinction is not sufficient because it “largely ignores the cultural rights dimension that has been central to the multiculturalism debate” (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 18). Thus, many recent studies have combined the cultural rights dimension with legal requirements for citizenship, thereby creating a more fruitful analytical distinction between citizenship ‘regime’ types (Castles, 1995; Greenfeld, 1999; Kleger and D'Amato, 1995; Safran, 1997). Generally, these authors identify three ideal citizenship regime types. The types, as labeled by Liah Greenfeld (1999), are collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic, and individualistic-civic.

First, the collectivistic-ethnic type is equivalent to the traditional “ethnic” nationalism distinction. It holds that “the world is naturally, or primordially, divided into objectively different ethnic units, and that it is this objective difference between them, or their ethnicity, which underlies national divisions and gives rise to national identities” (Greenfeld, 1999: 42). The nation is viewed in unitary terms with a unique spirit or ethos that transcends its component parts, that is, its members. The essential point from this perspective is that ethnicity is understood as primordial, and as such, leads to a natural sense of intra-ethnic solidarity and inter-ethnic difference. Thus, Tatu Vanhanen, for example, views ethnic groups as “genetic kinship groups” (Vanhanen, 1999), and Ernest Gellner argues that “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner, 1983: 1). Citizenship is understood not simply as membership in a political community, but also as a reflection of one’s cultural identity and “self” (Greenfeld, 1999: 51).

This relationship between nation and ethnicity is embodied in the jus sanguinis citizenship principle, which requires citizens to be of the same ethnic bloodline as that of the dominant, or traditional, ethnic group. As such, citizenship cannot be acquired or lost at a whim, because ethnicity is not a matter of choice, but rather biological necessity. Germany is often cited as the prototypical example, but Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg also share this tradition. In these countries it is very difficult for ethnic minorities to attain citizenship and hence the same political and civil rights as the native populations. Although migrants are often allowed into the country, their status has been traditionally that of “guestworkers” where they are expected to return to their native countries once their labor is no longer needed.

Second, the collectivistic-civic regime type, also called the “assimilationist” or “republican” model, is typified by France as well as the old “melting pot” approach in the United States. The nation-state is not defined in ethnic terms, but rather in political terms, which is intended to transcend cultural differences. To be a citizen means to be loyal to the nation as a political community. Citizenship and its accompanying political and civil liberties are acquired relatively easily through either naturalization or birth in the country. However, a high degree of assimilation is expected out of immigrants, especially within the public sphere. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are “expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population” (Castles, 1995: 297).
Furthermore, the role of the state is “to create conditions favorable to individual adaptation and transference of majority culture and values, through insistence on use of the dominant language and attendance at normal schools for migrant children” (Ibid, p 298). In other words, while ethnic minorities are allowed to maintain their cultural and religious traditions, they must do so in private. This attitude is illustrated by the recent headscarf affair in France, where Muslim girls were forbidden to wear headscarves in public schools.

The collectivistic-civic regime type, thus, seeks to remove ethnicity and cultural difference as a visible, public base of societal and political competition. Yet, this is extremely problematic and has proven to be relatively untenable. The major difficulty is that “the cultural group differences that are denied as legitimate policy categories do form the basis of discrimination and racism from the side of the majority population” (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 27). In France, for example, this manifests itself in the claims of the extreme right that ethnic minorities are “unassimilable” immigrants or “false Frenchmen,” who are “French by nationality, but not by culture—culture understood, of course, not in the ‘thin’ sense of adherence to republican values such as democracy, liberty, and equality, but in the ‘thick’ sense of folk traditions, Catholicism, and sometimes plainly race” (Ibid, p 27). In short, the claim that a nation-state is solely political and culturally neutral is problematic.

Finally, the individualistic-civic regime type, also termed the “pluralist” or “civic pluralism” model, combines the *jus soli* citizenship principle with the acceptance of ethnic and cultural difference. The nation-state is not understood as a collective, holistic entity. Rather, this type assumes “the moral, political, and logical primacy of the human individual, who is seen not simply as a physical unit of society, but as its constitutive element, in the sense that all qualities of the latter have their source in the nature of the former” (Greenfeld, 1999: 50). Ethnicity and cultural orientation is viewed as a personal choice, and ethnic minorities are not required to give up their ethnic difference in any sphere of public life. In fact, the state explicitly protects the right to ethnic difference and expression, and ethnicity is considered a legitimate public policy category. Moreover, such states often permit dual citizenship. This regime type may be “characterized as the acceptance of immigrant populations as ethnic communities which remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture, social behavior and associations over several generations” (Castles, 1995: 301).

Following Stephen Castles (1995), it is fruitful to distinguish further between two main variants of the individualistic-civic regime type that reflect the role of the state. In the first variant, the state takes a passive approach toward ethnic difference. Difference is accepted, but the state does not actively support the “reproduction” of ethnic cultures through public funds. Moreover, integration into the economy and society is largely the responsibility of immigrants. This approach is typical of the United States, as well as Great Britain. Public primary schools are taught largely in English, and there is limited public funding for easing the incorporation of new immigrants.

In the second variant, the state explicitly adopts multicultural policies that support ethnic minorities. While many countries apply multicultural policies to specific sectors of society, it is a more general policy in Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands. According to this perspective, ethnic and cultural difference is not only accepted, but “multi-culturalism also means recognition of special laws, institutions and social policies to overcome barriers to full participation in society” (Castles, 1995: 303). These states often provide services for migrants, “such as reception centers, help in finding work, language courses, educational support for
considered, and translating and interpreting services. Ethnic organizations participate in the planning of services through consultative bodies” (Ibid, p 303). Immigrants also may be granted some political rights before becoming citizens. In Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, immigrants are permitted to vote in local elections.

How do citizenship regimes relate to tolerance of ethnic minorities? In short, citizenship regimes are the legal institutionalization of prevailing cultural norms and understandings about the rights, duties and expectations of legitimate members of a nation-state. Legal requirements for citizenship and government policies toward ethnic difference affect discourse on how ethnic minorities should be viewed by the majority population. That is, they help answer questions about expectations regarding ethnic minorities’ role and responsibilities in society. Should ethnic minorities be denied citizenship and its accompanying political rights, because the nation-state is understood in ethnically exclusive terms? Alternatively, should minorities be granted full political rights as citizens but be expected to relinquish their cultural traditions and assimilate into the majority culture? Or, finally should they be granted citizenship and equal political rights, while being allowed to maintain their cultural traditions?

Political tolerance is the recognition that ethnic minorities are entitled to the same basic political rights as the majority population, while social tolerance refers to tolerating the content of that expression and a willingness to accept cultural and ethnic difference. For example, one may recognize that ethnic minorities are entitled to freedom of expression, yet it may be expected that the expression take a form in line with the majority cultural tradition. In addition, an individual may recognize that ethnic minorities have the right to be culturally different, but nonetheless the individual is intolerant when it comes to directly interacting with ethnic minorities.

Based on the discussion, several hypotheses emerge regarding the relationship between citizenship regimes and political and social tolerance:

H1—Collectivistic-ethnic countries ought to have relatively low levels of both political and social tolerance for ethnic minorities.

H2—Collectivistic-civic countries should show a high level of political tolerance but a low level of social tolerance.

H3—Individualistic-civic countries should show the highest levels of both political and social tolerance.

H4—Among individualistic-civic countries those with “active” governments should have higher levels of both social and political tolerance than those with more “passive” governments.
Methodology and Measurement

This analysis employs a unique data set to examine the levels of tolerance across Western Europe—the 1997 Eurobarometer Survey (Melich, 1997). The survey administered a module of questions intended to tap the extent and depth of prejudice and intolerance in Europe’s so-called “Year Against Racism.” The populations surveyed were the 15 nations of the European Union (EU) with Germany divided into the states making up the former East Germany and those of West Germany. In addition, a separate survey was administered in Northern Ireland. Thus, there are a total of 17 cases for analysis.

Measuring Political and Social Tolerance

In measuring political and social tolerance, I create indices for both types. The political tolerance index taps the majority population’s principled recognition that ethnic minorities are entitled to the same basic political rights as the native population. Respondents were asked to state whether certain rights and freedoms “should apply equally to people from [the ethnic minority group] and to the rest of the population, or only to the rest of the population.” The questions comprising the index are:

1. Freedom of Speech.
4. Equality before the Law.
5. The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections.

Social tolerance, on the other hand, refers to tolerating the content of that expression and a willingness actually to accept cultural and ethnic difference. The questions comprising the social tolerance index include:

1. If people from this [ethnic group] lived in your neighborhood, would you find this difficult to accept, or not?
2. If a suitably qualified person from this [ethnic group] became your boss, would you find this difficult to accept, or not?
3. Do the religious practices of this [ethnic group] threaten our way of life?

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5 I would like to thank the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan for use of this study (ICPSR Study No. 2089). I also examined data from a 1995 ISSP Survey on National Identity that tapped attitudes toward immigrants. This survey has the advantage of including more geographically diverse countries, however, it inquires much less into specific attitudes toward immigrants. Preliminary analysis of this data set showed findings similar to those from the survey employed in this paper.
4. Members of this [ethnic group] are so different, they can never be fully accepted as members of (nationality) society.

5. In order to become fully accepted members of (nationality) society, they must give up their own culture.

The responses for each of the questions comprising the indices were binary. All questions were recoded so that a value of “0” corresponds to an “intolerant” response and a value of “1” corresponds to a “tolerant” response. Summing across the five questions, gives scores for both types of tolerance. In order to minimize missing cases, I included all respondents who answered at least three of the five questions for each index. Because I included respondents who answered less than five questions, it was necessary to standardize the scores—that is, to divide a respondent’s total score by the number of questions answered. Thus, the standardized tolerance scale runs from “0” to “1” and from intolerant to tolerant.

**Classifying Cases by Citizen Regime Type**

It is important to realize that the citizenship regime models are ideal types. Countries may have different policies toward immigrants of specific countries, family members of current citizens or permanent residents, asylum seekers, or refugees. There also exist competing discourses in virtually every country on the proper understanding of the nation-state and expectations of citizenship. Legal definitions and cultural understandings of citizenship are extremely important, and hence, highly contested issues.

Nonetheless, nation-states do have prevailing cultural understandings and official legal policies regarding citizenship acquisition and ethnic difference. Based on these criteria, I classify the cases as approximating one of the ideal citizenship regime types. In doing this, I rely on several different sources. First, as discussed above, scholars have done case studies of varying specificity on citizenship regime policies and traditions for several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. For the other countries, I employ data from Patrick Weil (2001) for the political dimension on citizenship acquisition laws. The cultural rights dimension, however, is more difficult to classify with complete confidence. For this aspect, I rely on empirical data regarding naturalization requirements—specifically, whether knowledge of language, a loyalty oath, “good character,” and renunciation of prior citizenship are required to attain citizenship. I also supplement the formal requirements with short case-study descriptions of cultural policies.

Table 1 presents a summary of the classifications and hypotheses for each regime type.

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6 The only exception is question #2 on the social tolerance index. It allowed respondents four possible replies: “very difficult,” “fairly difficult,” “not very difficult,” and “not at all difficult” to accept. The responses were recoded so that the former two constituted an “intolerant” response, whereas the latter constituted a “tolerant” response.

7 The specific criterion I use is whether or not citizenship is automatically granted to 2nd generation immigrants at the time of birth.

Table 1: Country Classification and Hypotheses by Citizenship Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime Type</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-ethnic</strong></td>
<td>Germany (former East and West are presented separately) Austria Belgium Luxembourg</td>
<td>Low Social Tolerance Low Political Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-civic</strong></td>
<td>France Ireland Portugal Greece</td>
<td>Low Social Tolerance High Political Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic</strong> (passive states)</td>
<td>Great Britain N. Ireland Denmark Italy Spain</td>
<td>High Social Tolerance High Political Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic</strong> (active states)</td>
<td>The Netherlands Sweden Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Respondents and the Content-Controlled Method

In this survey not all respondents were asked the political and social tolerance questions. Rather, following the “content-controlled” method (Sullivan et al. 1982; Marcus et al. 1995), respondents had to first identify a group not of the same race, religion or culture that they “sometimes find disturbing.” The basic assumption behind the “content-controlled” method is that supporting political and social rights for a group one likes or with which one sympathizes, does not constitute tolerance in any meaningful way. Since all respondents were not asked the tolerance questions, it is not possible to make general conclusions regarding absolute levels of tolerance in a country, unless it is assumed that all who failed to identify a disliked ethnic group are tolerant of those groups. However, in the survey respondents who failed to identify an ethnic group that they personally disliked were then asked a follow up question: whether there was an ethnic minority group that other people in the country sometimes found disturbing. Respondents who answered this question affirmatively also were asked the political and social tolerance questions. For comparison and control purposes, I will present the results for these respondents. While the levels of tolerance should be higher than those that identified an ethnic group they personally found disturbing, one would expect the pattern across the regime types to be similar for both groups. Finally, it is important to note that results are only for the attitudes of
the majority population toward ethnic minorities. Respondents who self-identified as a member of an ethnic minority group were excluded from the analysis. The focus is on the majority population’s tolerance for ethnic minorities.

Empirical Results

The analyses begin by comparing the levels of political and social tolerance for each nation by citizenship regime type. Table 2 presents these results for respondents who identified an ethnic minority in their country that they “sometimes find disturbing.” The numbers reported in the table are standardized mean index scores. The scale runs from 0 to 1 with larger numbers corresponding to a higher level of tolerance.

First, the table shows that the collectivistic-ethnic countries demonstrate relatively low levels of both political and social tolerance. Among these countries, Belgium and Austria have the lowest levels of political tolerance, closely followed by residents of the former West Germany. Perhaps surprisingly, the former East Germany has the highest level of both political and social tolerance among these four cases. Much has been made recently about the resurfacing of neo-fascist movements and the increase in violent attacks on ethnic minorities in the Laender of the former DDR (Koopmans, 1996). One might expect former East Germans also to demonstrate low levels of social and political tolerance, which they do in comparison to the individualistic-civic countries, but not in comparison to the former West Germany, Austria and Belgium. Belgium demonstrates the lowest levels of both social and political tolerance among all cases analyzed.

Turning now to the collectivistic-civic type, one can see that with the exception of France the tolerance levels generally fit the expected pattern. Ireland, Greece and Portugal show relatively high levels of political tolerance but low levels of social tolerance. While France exhibits a low level of social tolerance as expected, the French respondents also reveal a relatively low level of political tolerance. In fact, among all cases France is second only to Belgium in terms of the lowest levels of both political and social tolerance. As mentioned in the discussion above, the claim that France is primarily a political and not a cultural nation-state is both problematic and contested. A central claim of the far-right National Front, as well as previous far-right movements, is that France is a nation with a distinctly “French” political culture, to which immigrants and ethnic minorities cannot be assimilated. Thus, the National Front advocates a policy of repatriation of immigrants and complete exclusion of “false Frenchmen” from the social and political community. For those who dislike ethnic minorities, there is an “acceptable” exclusionary ideology supporting both political and social intolerance of ethnic minorities.
Table 2: Tolerance of Ethnic Minorities among Respondents who Identified an Ethnic Minority Group They Disliked—Standardized Mean Index Scores (0 to 1) with “1” corresponding to “Tolerant”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type and Country</th>
<th>Political Tolerance (mean)</th>
<th>Social Tolerance (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-ethnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>.46</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-civic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>.48</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic (passive)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.78</strong></td>
<td><strong>.58</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic (active)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>.62</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 47.1
Finally, the individualistic-civic countries, as hypothesized, report the highest levels of political tolerance. The difference between these countries and the “collectivistic” countries is quite substantial. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland have political tolerance levels more than twice that of the five collectivistic-ethnic cases and France. Political tolerance is lower in Italy, Denmark, and Northern Ireland, yet relative to countries of the other regime types the level is still higher. Moreover, with the exception of Spain, the three explicitly multicultural countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, have the highest levels of political tolerance—albeit, the difference is small compared to Great Britain.

Looking at the mean social tolerance scores, one can see that with the exception of Sweden and Denmark, the individualistic-civic cases have much higher levels of social tolerance than the other countries. Furthermore, in comparing the “passive” and “active” individualistic-civic countries, the table shows that social tolerance in the Netherlands and Finland is higher than in each of the “passive” individualistic-civic countries. Sweden, however, does not fit the hypothesized pattern very well. It has the lowest level of social tolerance among the individualistic-civic countries, and in fact, more closely resembles the collectivistic countries—albeit, Sweden’s social tolerance level is still lower than all but the former East Germany. A possible explanation for this result is that as mentioned above Sweden historically has been quite culturally homogenous. Only recently has it experienced a rapid increase in immigration from non-European countries. The actual acceptance of cultural and ethnic difference may take longer to develop than a principled recognition that ethnic minorities are entitled to the same political rights and liberties as the native population.

As stated above, only those respondents who first identified an ethnic minority group they personally found disturbing were included in Table 2. Yet, as a control group, a second set of respondents were asked the tolerance questions if they identified an ethnic minority that other people in their country “sometimes found disturbing.” Looking at the levels of political and social tolerance among these respondents helps give a more fruitful gauge of the relationship between citizenship regimes and tolerance. Table 3 presents the political and social tolerance levels for these respondents.

Not surprisingly, the levels of both political and social tolerance are much higher in this table. We are concerned, however, about the patterns of tolerance across countries. The different levels of tolerance across the states are similar to those in Table 3 with three important exceptions. First, the gap in political tolerance between collectivistic-ethnic and individualistic-civic countries is much smaller—especially for the German speaking cases. Second, Belgium differentiates itself even more from the other cases with relatively low levels of reported tolerance. This suggests that cultural norms about ethnic exclusion are deeply entrenched in Belgium. Finally, and probably the most interesting finding, is that the levels of both political and social tolerance are much higher for France. In terms of political tolerance, France more closely resembles the individualistic-civic countries as initially was hypothesized. Yet, social tolerance is also relatively high among these respondents. This further reinforces the idea that contestation over conceptions of citizenship are particularly strong and polarized in France.

In sum, the empirical results generally support the hypotheses presented in Table 1 on the relationship between citizenship regime types and political and social tolerance.
Table 3: Tolerance of Ethnic Minorities among Respondents who Identified an Ethnic Minority Group that “Others” Disliked—Standardized Mean Index Scores (0 to 1) with “1” corresponding to “Tolerant”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type and Country</th>
<th>Political Tolerance (mean)</th>
<th>Social Tolerance (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-ethnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>.72</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivistic-civic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.89</strong></td>
<td><strong>.76</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic (passive)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>.84</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualistic-civic (active)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>.83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Eurobarometer 47
The collectivistic-ethnic countries tend to have lower levels of both political and social tolerance than the individualistic-civic countries. Moreover, among the individualistic-civic countries, those that adopt more explicitly multicultural policies show the highest levels of political tolerance. In terms of social tolerance, this is also the case for the Netherlands and Finland, but not for Sweden. Contrary to our hypothesis, there is a relatively low level of social tolerance for Sweden. Furthermore, contrary to our hypotheses, France has a relatively low level of political tolerance among those who identified an ethnic minority they personally found disturbing. Yet, looking at respondents that identified an ethnic minority “others” find disturbing, the level of political tolerance is relatively higher, fitting expectations from the citizenship regime framework.

**Alternative Approaches to the Study of Tolerance and Competing Hypotheses**

The next step is to analyze the framework developed in this paper in a more rigorous fashion. In order to do this I will examine possible alternative explanations for cross-national tolerance variations and compare these to the citizenship regime typology. It is first necessary to provide a review of conventional approaches to the study of tolerance. Conventional approaches have examined tolerance predominantly from an individual level perspective and these approaches can be divided into three veins: socio-cultural, self-interested, and psychological. I do not intend to give a comprehensive review of these approaches; rather, I simply want to highlight the primary arguments that may help to explain cross-national differences in tolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities.

First, socio-cultural explanations focus on how cultural norms shape individual tolerance judgments. This approach shuns the notion that humans are in anyway “hardwired” or inherently predisposed to be intolerant, and instead argues that tolerance is largely learned. Socialized values and norms, learned primarily in the early stages of life, influence individuals’ attitudes toward others and their willingness to tolerate those deemed different. According to this perspective, the key, determining factor accounting for prejudice and intolerance is education. Education is the principal vehicle in modern societies for transmitting social and cultural values, including those of tolerance and social acceptance. In addition, the higher the education level, the more likely one is to learn about groups different from one’s own. Typically, this approach uses statistical techniques to demonstrate the correlation between education level (and other social status measures) and various measures of tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982). The general prediction is that those of the working class, lower income groups, and less education are more likely to express prejudiced and intolerant attitudes.9

Socio-cultural explanations lead one to examine two variables at the macro-level: the aggregate level of education and the years of continuous democratic rule in a country. Nation-states with a higher aggregate level of education (measured as average years of education) ought to have higher levels of tolerance. Furthermore, individuals living in older democracies have had longer experience with democratic principles and values, and as such, may better internalize tolerance principles than citizens of younger democracies. Running counter to this hypothesis,

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9 It is contested, however, whether higher education actually results in increased tolerance, or simply produces more sophisticated survey responses (Jackman and Muha 1984).
as well as conventional wisdom, Duch and Gibson (1992: 261) hypothesize and find a negative correlation between years of democratic rule and tolerance for neo-fascists. According to them, “as countries move from authoritarian to democratic regimes, the value placed on democratic freedoms becomes quite high. Those who have experienced the deprivation of democratic freedom are more likely to accord such liberties high value.”

Second, self-interest approaches argue that individuals develop prejudiced and intolerant attitudes toward groups with whom they believe they are in competition or conflict. This perspective assumes individuals see the world as a zero-sum game, where another’s gain is their loss. Accordingly, one can interpret prejudice and intolerance as a rational calculus of advantage for the purpose of furthering one’s interests. There are several variants of this thesis. First, immigrants and ethnic minorities are often employed in unskilled and manual labor professions (Castles, 1984), and hence, it is assumed that the native working class and unemployed, which compete more directly with ethnic minorities for jobs, are less likely to be tolerant. This can be termed the “labor market” hypothesis (Muller and Epenshade, 1985). The second variation is the “use of services” thesis, which argues natives’ fears about the use of public services by minorities, for which natives pay the taxes, fuel racial prejudice. This suggests, contrary to the “labor market” hypothesis, that the wealthy, who pay the lion’s share of the tax burden in industrialized nations, would be less tolerant. Previous studies, however, have found little empirical support for either of these hypotheses (Sears and Funk 1991; Fetzer 2000). Finally, self-interest approaches also consider the changing financial situation of individuals, rather than their absolute position within society. This is often operationalized either as reflections on personal financial changes in the recent past, or expected changes in the near future.10 The expectation is those whose financial situation has worsened, or is expected to worsen in the future, are more likely to view ethnic minorities as a threat, and hence, more likely to be prejudiced and intolerant.

Transferring these ideas to the macro-level of analysis, I consider several variables. First, I examine the economic development of the country. This includes both the percentage of the population in the tertiary sector and the overall economic development of a country (measured as GNP per capita). Second, in order to get at the short-term aspect of self-interest explanations, I consider the change in economic growth over the five years preceding the survey of tolerant attitudes (from 1992-1997). Yet, some have suggested that individuals do not consider their personal financial situation when making tolerance judgments, but rather the key factor is individuals’ perception of the national economy as a whole (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Accordingly, prejudice and intolerance should rise when a country is in recession and decline in prosperous times (Quillian, 1995). Finally, in line with the idea behind self-interest approaches, students of tolerance often assume that the size of the ethnic minority group has a significant affect on the majority group’s level of tolerance (Muller and Epenshade, 1985; Quillian, 1995). We examine this assumption by considering the size of the ethnic minority population, as well as net migration flows preceding the survey. In an interesting study of cross-national differences in prejudice levels, Lincoln Quillian (1995) is able to explain 75% of the variance across European countries with these two variables—the state of the economy and minority group size.

10 It is worth noting that these operationalizations rely partially on subjective interpretations and may be tapping personal anxiety, which is only indirectly related to self-interest.
Finally, psychological approaches constitute the most fervent area of research on prejudice and tolerance. These approaches view prejudice and intolerance as resulting from personality and emotional traits that are largely beyond the control of individuals. Certain attributes predispose individuals to think and behave in certain ways, and thus, it is argued that some people have a natural propensity to be intolerant. Early research in this vein was heavily influenced by Freud and focused on the psycho-pathological tendencies that resulted from early childhood experience (Adorno, 1950). More recent research has focused on the psychological displacement of fear or anxiety as a result of a perceived threat from disliked groups (Sullivan et al., 1982; Marcus et al. 1995). Psychological traits of self-esteem and dogmatism, as well as the level of perceived threat from the group, are important factors in explaining whether one is tolerant. Factors that help overcome intolerance include education, insofar as it makes individuals more reflective, and hence, better able to control their negative dispositions, and face-to-face interaction with the disliked group—this is Gordon Allport’s inter-group contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998; Allport, 1954). At the macro-level, again, I will consider the impact of aggregate education levels. Moreover, based on the ideas behind inter-group contact theory, I consider the ethno-cultural pluralization of a nation-state. Contrary to the hypothesis derived from self-interest approaches, inter-group contact theory suggests that tolerance levels should be higher in societies that are more heterogeneous.

In addition, several recent contributions to the literature, influenced by Social Identity Theory, have begun to examine contextual and group level factors (Marcus et al., 1995; Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Sniderman, 2000). First, in an important contribution, George E. Marcus and colleagues (1995: 22) investigated the effects of contemporary information on tolerance judgments. Contemporary information refers to new stimuli available from the current environment. It may reference the group in question or alternatively stress the importance of competing principles, such as tolerance as a principled value. The study found that information decreasing the perception of threat from a group, arguments about the proper application of democratic principles, and priming respondents’ attention toward thoughts rather than emotions were all correlated with increased tolerance judgments (Ibid, p 215). Second, in a study of South Africa, James Gibson and Amanda Gouws apply the ideas of the in-group/out-group paradigm to tolerance among the various ethnic groups. Specifically, they test and verify the hypotheses that strong ingroup positive identities create strong out-group negative identities, which are in turn connected to antipathy toward one’s political opponents, perceptions that those opponents are threatening, and, ultimately, to political intolerance (Gibson and Gouws, 2000).

These findings are important, however, it is not clear what real world factors actually increase ingroup ethnic identification and perceptions of threat. The studies suggest that the type of political tactics and activities a group employs may play an important role in influencing tolerance judgments. Individuals may not support political rights for groups that adopt radical, violent, and in general, non-democratic tactics. The political and social environment also may have an impact, especially on perceptions of threat. Specifically, the prevailing media and political elite discourse regarding ethnic minorities likely plays an important role in influencing tolerance judgments. A common claim of far-right political parties is that ethnic minorities are more often involved in crime and hence are a threat to individual security. Thus, an important factor to consider is the strength of radical right-wing, anti-immigrant parties in each country.
One may expect that countries with stronger right-wing parties are likely to have lower levels of aggregate tolerance.\(^\text{11}\)

In sum, the tolerance literature is heavily laden with micro-level approaches that draw on several research traditions. Despite differing explanations, a consensus appears to have developed on the key individual level predictors: education, working class occupation, authoritarian attitudes and perceptions of threat.

**Testing the Competing Hypotheses: Bivariate Correlations**

To further our understanding of variations in national tolerance levels, we turn now to more rigorous analyses of the competing hypotheses. Tables 4 and 5 present bivariate correlations between the hypothesized independent variables and aggregate levels of tolerance for those who personally found an ethnic minority disturbing and those identifying a group “others” in their country found disturbing, respectively. Due to the small sample size, it is important to be cautious about these findings. Despite this limitation, the analyses do serve as a valuable step in ferreting out the macro-level influences on tolerance judgments.

Looking at the two tables, one can see that the pattern across countries is very similar for both sets of respondents. This further suggests that individual level characteristics alone are insufficient to explain tolerance judgments; macro-level factors also have an independent influence in structuring individuals’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities. In terms of the specific variables, the only significant and robust correlations are those related to citizenship regime type.

First, contrary to the findings of Raymond Duch and James Gibson (1992), in their study of tolerance toward neo-fascists in Western Europe, younger democracies do not show a higher level of tolerance than older democracies. In fact, direct experience with democratic institutions appears to be rather trivial in explaining either political or social tolerance levels. Aggregate education level, the second socio-cultural factor hypothesized to affect tolerance levels, has virtually no affect on political tolerance but a moderate affect on social tolerance—albeit, this finding is not significant. The direction of this relationship is also in the hypothesized direction, with more educated countries showing greater tolerance.

Turning to the economic variables, again none of the relationships are significant. GNP per capita has the strongest affect among these variables, but it is the poorer countries that show higher tolerance levels. Interestingly, nations experiencing recent economic growth and lower unemployment rates are less likely to be tolerant. This finding contradicts our expectations and Lincoln Quillian’s (1995) finding on levels of prejudice toward ethnic minorities. Again running counter to the hypothesized affect, countries with a larger proportion of the population employed in the tertiary sector are slightly less likely to be tolerant. Overall, although the relationships are not significant, they suggest that the higher the level of economic development in a country, the less tolerant the native population. A possible explanation is that citizens in wealthier countries

---

\(^{11}\) Despite a correlation between far-right party support and intolerant attitudes, causality would be difficult to establish both empirically and theoretically for this relationship. Clearly, less tolerant individuals are more likely to vote for far-right political parties. At the same time, the existence of a strong far-right party helps to shape the attitudes of individuals toward immigrants and ethnic minorities in a more intolerant direction.
are less willing to support a social welfare state that they perceive benefits primarily “foreigners”—what has been termed the “use of services” thesis.

Another possible explanation is that wealthier countries simply have larger ethnic minority populations and higher rates of immigration than poorer countries. This is, in fact, the case.¹² Yet, looking at the relationships between these factors (percentage of foreign population and net migration), one sees that these are not significant. Nonetheless, the affects are moderate and negatively correlated with both types of tolerance—that is, the larger the ethnic minority population and the higher the rate of immigration, the lower the level of aggregate tolerance. The final competing explanatory factor is the strength of far-right, anti-immigrant parties, insofar as they help fan fears of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients for Political and Social Tolerance among Respondents who Identified an Ethnic Minority Group they Personally Disliked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Political Tolerance</th>
<th>Social Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Cultural Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Continuous Democracy</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Education Level</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per Capita</td>
<td>-.378</td>
<td>-.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GNP per Capita</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (1996)</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in Tertiary Sector</td>
<td>-.180</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Group Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Foreigners</td>
<td>-.305</td>
<td>-.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration Rate (87-97)</td>
<td>-.274</td>
<td>-.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevalence of Anti-Immigrant Discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Far-Right Party Vote Share</td>
<td>-.327</td>
<td>-.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship Regime Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Citizenship Acquisition for 2nd generation Immigrants</td>
<td>.583*</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mono vs. Multi-Cultural Policy</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.736**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Political and Cultural Dimensions</td>
<td>.752**</td>
<td>.723**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 47.1. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Northern Ireland is not included in the correlations for “minority group factors.”

¹² The correlation between GNP per capita and the percentage of foreigners is .721, p < .01, and the correlation between GNP per capita and net migration is .580, p < .05.
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients for Political and Social Tolerance among Respondents who Identified an Ethnic Minority Group “Others” Disliked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Political Tolerance</th>
<th>Social Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Cultural Factors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Continuous Democracy</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Education Level</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.377</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Factors</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per Capita</td>
<td>-.196</td>
<td>-.028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in GNP per Capita</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>-.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (1996)</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in Tertiary Sector</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Group Factors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Foreigners</td>
<td>-.379</td>
<td>-.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration Rate (87-97)</td>
<td>-.347</td>
<td>-.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevalence of Anti-Immigrant Discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Far-Right Party Vote Share</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship Regime Type</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Citizenship Acquisition for 2nd generation Immigrants</td>
<td>.757**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mono vs. Multi-Cultural Policy</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.646**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Political and Cultural Dimensions</td>
<td>.736**</td>
<td>.627**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 47.1. * p < .05, ** p < .01. * Northern Ireland is not included in the correlations for “minority group factors.”

For those who identified an ethnic minority group that they personally found disturbing, the strength of far-right parties does have a moderate negative affect on political tolerance and a slight negative affect on social tolerance. However, these variables likely are mutually reinforcing—that is, intolerance contributes to far-right electoral support as much as far-right party rhetoric contributes to intolerance.

Finally, turning to the citizenship regime type variables, the analysis shows that the affects are quite robust. The political dimension—that is, the formal, legal requirements for citizenship acquisition (operationalized as whether a country grants automatic citizenship to 2nd generation immigrants) is strongly correlated with aggregate levels of political tolerance for both sets of respondents. The Pearson correlations are .583, p < .05 and .757, p < .01 for tables 4 and 5, respectively. The cultural rights dimension (operationalized as a binary variable as to whether countries adopt a mono or multi-cultural policy) is also strongly and significantly correlated with the level of social tolerance across countries. The final variable is an effort to combine the political and cultural dimensions of citizenship. Combining the two dimensions into a single variable reflects the idea that one can also view citizenship regime types as being on a single continuum that indicates the openness of a nation-state toward ethnic minorities. This
“citizenship regime type” variable includes all four types, coded “0” to “3” with scores of 2 and 3 representing the two individualistic-civic types (passive and active, respectively). It is a particular strong predictor of political and social tolerance for both sets of respondents. This further reinforces the hypotheses from the macro-theoretical framework developed in this paper.

Conclusion

The central finding in this paper is that tolerance for ethnic minorities is strongly related to the laws governing citizenship acquisition and norms regarding the expression of ethnic difference. It is these institutions that help determine the context of inter-ethnic group relations, and as work in the social identity literature suggests, context is critically important in understanding inter-group relations. It helps define group membership, that is, the in-groups and out-groups in a society, which in turn has important effects on in-group / out-group attitudes and behavior. As this paper supports, individual level variables are insufficient to explain cross-national variations in tolerance levels. Although scholars have been able to identify several individual level factors related to tolerance, these same factors lose their explanatory power at the aggregate level. In fact, in this study the transfer of the key individual level predictors to the macro-level produced little impact on aggregate tolerance levels. In particular, the overall and changing state of the economy, as well as education, were not related to either social or political tolerance. Thus, it is a fruitful and necessary step to move beyond such conventional, individual level explanations as I have sought to do here.

Drawing on the citizenship regime and multiculturalism literature, I offer a macro-theoretical framework for understanding cross-national differences in tolerance toward ethnic minorities. Citizenship has emerged as an important analytical tool in understanding a wide variety of political issues, such as nationalism, migration, identity and various domestic policy areas. It provides an important link to these phenomenon because “it brings within its orbit three fundamental issues: how the boundaries of membership within a polity and between polities should be defined; how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated; and how the identities of members should be comprehended and accommodated” (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001: 3). Government policies toward citizenship are reflective of historical and prevailing cultural norms about who should be regarded as a legitimate member of the nation-state. Moreover, the policies of a nation-state set the boundaries for discourse on images of citizenship, and hence, affect native populations’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. Should ethnic minorities be entitled to the same political rights as the native population? Should they be required to give up their own cultural traditions and assimilate into the majority culture?

Each of the citizenship regime types provides different answers to these questions, and as the empirical results suggest, citizenship regime policies have important implications for the majority populations’ political and social tolerance of ethnic minorities. Specifically, nation-states that are ethnically exclusive and collectivistic oriented show the lowest levels of aggregate tolerance. At the other end of the spectrum, those with open citizenship acquisition laws and those allowing the public expression of ethnic difference demonstrate the highest levels of tolerance—especially those nation-states that publicly support ethnic difference. This suggests that political institutions do have a strong impact in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and promoting democratic values. Nonetheless, it is also plausible that it is citizens’
attitudes that determine the type of citizenship regime in a nation-state. Although the social identity literature indicates that the context of group relations largely determines members’ attitudes and behavior, it is not possible based solely on the analysis in this study to reach this conclusion. In order to better address the issue of causality, it would be fruitful in a future study to examine more closely a nation-state that changes its citizenship and cultural policy laws. Looking at tolerance levels both before and after the change would give a better gauge of how exactly institutions affect individual tolerance judgments.

The results of this analysis indicate several other avenues for future research. First, this study was partially limited in the number of cases by the lack of available survey evidence on tolerance of ethnic minorities. An important step in this vein would be to extend the number of cases, while possibly developing more “objective” data on the citizenship and cultural policies of states. This would give a much better assessment of the relationship between citizenship regime types and tolerance. Second, this approach to tolerance is not competing, but complementary to micro-level theories of tolerance. A logical next step is to incorporate these micro-level approaches with the macro-level model developed here. In particular, the research by Marcus and colleagues (1995) on the impact of contemporary information is intimately related to institutional explanations of tolerance levels. Finally, and related to the second point, the findings indicate a need to rethink our approaches to understanding tolerance. Specifically, individuals experience competing influences on tolerance judgments. Tolerance is often treated as an ideal value, and variability among individuals is assumed to be simply the result of factors that facilitate or impede the social learning process (Duch and Gibson, 1992). Yet, this study indicates that not all system level factors reinforce tolerant attitudes; rather, there are also factors that appear to hinder the development of such attitudes. In order to understand fully the nature of tolerance, it is necessary to understand the political and social context in which people are required to make tolerance judgments.
Bibliography


